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In 1992, in what surely must be one of its most convoluted
1
opinions involving free speech issues, the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the conviction of a juvenile who had burned a
2
makeshift cross in the yard of a neighbor. The young man, known
3
only as R.A.V. because of his age, had been convicted of violating
4
three federal statutes—convictions that would be upheld —but could
not be convicted of the cross burning, the Court held, because the St.
5
Paul ordinance under which he was convicted was discriminatory.
The Court’s holding in R.A.V. v. St Paul has been demonstrated
by both the literature and the case law to be anything but clear-cut. In
a maze of rationale that is still difficult to follow, the Court did not
say outright that cross burning is constitutionally protected. Indeed, it
established a complicated framework that, despite years of case law to
the contrary, would allow a court to hold a law banning cross burning
6
to be constitutional, even if the law was not content neutral.
The R.A.V. decision was met with a chorus of disapproval. The
case, one scholar wrote, demonstrates “that no one theory of the
application of the free speech guarantee yet commands widespread
support. Indeed, the R.A.V. decision, aside from being riddled with
ironies, is a classic example of a court united in judgment and divided
7
in understanding.” Another commentator criticized the Court for
ignoring “the fundamental issues surrounding hate crime legislation”

1. The use of the word “convoluted” to describe the opinion is not original to this
article. See Jerome O’Callaghan, Free Speech by the Light of a Burning Cross, 42 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 215, 235 (1994); see also Jonathan M. Holdowsky, Out of the Ashes of the
Cross: The Legacy of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1115, 115 (1996) (“Few
cases in recent years have confused the landscape of First Amendment jurisprudence more
than R.A.V. v. St. Paul.”). In addition, Justice John Paul Stevens called a portion of the
majority opinion “opaque.” R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 424 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
2. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
3. The juvenile was Robert A. Viktora. He was subsequently identified in a number
of sources. See, e.g., EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE LANDMARK R.A.V. CASE (1994); Nick Coleman, It Takes a Creep
to Burn a Cross, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 23, 1992, at 1B; Nick Coleman, The
Court Sends a Message. Hate Crimes: Will Ruling Spur Bigotry?, ATLANTA CONST., June
25, 1992, at A15.
4. See United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994). The decision combined
cases against three juveniles, including R.A.V.
5. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
6. See, e.g., infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
7. O’Callaghan, supra note 1, at 216; see also Richard J. Williams Jr., Burning
Crosses and Blazing Words: Hate Speech and the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Clause
Jurisprudence, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 609, 678-79 (1995).
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and constructing an “intricate new rule.”8 Instead, the Court could
9
have applied the same analysis it did in Texas v. Johnson —that is, the
10
strict scrutiny analysis—and could have arrived at the same holding.
Or, the commentator continued, the Court could have created a new
category of unprotected expression for hate speech, similar to that of
11
fighting words, private libel and obscenity.
In addition, since 1992, when the decision was delivered, states
have taken up the challenge to produce laws that would pass
constitutional muster while, at the same time, would ban cross
burning. Cross-burning cases have been decided by six state appellate
courts since R.A.V. In two of those cases, state statutes have been
12
held to be constitutional; in the remainder, the statutes—or portions
13
of the statutes—have been held to be unconstitutional.
When the Court took up the issue of cross burning for a second
time, therefore, a reasonable deduction was that it did so to help
resolve the confusion it created in R.A.V. The issues seemed to be
relatively clear-cut.
The Commonwealth of Virginia and its supporters had
encouraged the Court to uphold a ban on cross burning because the
history of the action made it so obnoxious that any expressive content
14
was outweighed by hatred and virulence intrinsic to cross burning.
They also argued that cross burning consisted of conduct—
15
specifically, threatening conduct—rather than speech and, therefore,
16
the government could more easily restrict it. Indeed, some
commentators argued that cross burning belonged in a category of
8. Michael S. Degan, “Adding the First Amendment to the Fire”: Cross Burning and
Hate Crime Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1144 (1993).
9. 419 U.S. 397 (1989).
10. Degan, supra note 8, at 1145 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
11. Id.
12. See In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Florida v. T.B.D.,
656 So. 2d 479 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995). See also infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
13. See New Jersey v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1994); State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d
511 (S.C. 1993); Maryland v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993); Washington v. Talley, 858
P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993). See also infra notes 149-52, 155-65 and accompanying text.
14. See Brief of Petitioner at 32-37, Virginia v. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (No.
01-1107). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae State of New Jersey et al. at 10, Virginia v.
Black, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107).
15. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States at 11, 26, Virginia v. Black, 553
S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation at 3, Virginia v. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League et al. at 15, Virginia v. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738
(Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107); Brief of Amicus Curiae State of California at 2, Virginia v.
Black, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107).
16. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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speech that lay outside First Amendment protection.17 One
commentator suggested that the Court create a new category of
speech—“abhorrent” speech—that would include cross burning and
other forms of speech that the Court would hold were unprotected by
18
the Constitution.
Free speech advocates, on the other hand, argued that the
19
history of cross burning gave the activity its substantive message.
That is, cross burning was banned specifically because of the hateful
message it conveyed, but the Constitution prohibited the proscription
20
of speech just because it is obnoxious, offensive or even hateful. The
regulation, they also argued, is a content-based, viewpoint-based
21
restriction on speech.
In Virginia v. Black,22 however, the Court refused the invitation
to settle the issue and, taking a compromise position, tromped further
into the mire that had surrounded cross burning for eleven years. It
held that states have the power under the First Amendment to ban
23
cross burning as intimidating speech. Intimidating speech is
equivalent to threatening speech, the Court held, which may be
24
regulated. However, the Court also found the Virginia statute to be
25
unconstitutional because it restricted all forms of cross burning.
Some cross burning, the Court noted, is, in fact, political speech and
26
deserving of First Amendment protection.
The Court, therefore, chose to bifurcate the issue, making
inevitable further opinions in which it will be required to carve out a
test providing guidance for lower courts confronted with cross
burning cases. The history of the cross-burning debate in the courts
demonstrates that a more logical path would have been for the Court
to hold that cross burning is protected political speech, but to allow
17. See, generally, C. Catherine Scullon, Cross Burning is Not a Threat: Constitutional
Protection for Hate Speech, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 631 (1994).
18. See Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of
Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (1992).
19. See Brief on Merits for Respondents at 12-14, Virginia v. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738
(Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107).
20. See id.
21. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of
Freedom of Expression at 5-14, Virginia v. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107).
See also, Brief of Amicus Curiae The Rutherford Institute at 2-9, Virginia v. Black, 553
S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (No. 01-1107).
22. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
23. Id. at 363.
24. Id. at 360.
25. Id. at 365.
26. Id. at 366.

2004]

CROSS BURNING REVISITED: VIRGINIA V. BLACK

273

law enforcement agencies to prosecute cross burners when the
activity is clearly threatening or is part of broader threatening
conduct. The history of cross burning jurisprudence is described here,
followed by an evaluation of the Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black.

I.

R.A.V. v. St. Paul

R.A.V., with at least two other teenagers, assembled a cross from
27
broken chair legs and burned it in the fenced yard of a black family.
He was convicted of violating St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance, which provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits
28
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

The trial court dismissed the action on grounds that the
ordinance was overbroad and impermissibly content-based, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that its narrow
interpretation of the ordinance was sufficient to limit its reach only to
29
fighting words. The ordinance, therefore, according to the state
supreme court, only reached speech not protected by the First
30
Amendment. R.A.V. appealed to the Supreme Court.
A. Arguments to the Supreme Court

The questions presented to the Supreme Court in the petition for
certiorari and in briefs on the merits focused on whether local
governments could pass so-called “hate-crime” ordinances, even
when those ordinances had been narrowly construed to proscribe
31
only fighting words or incitement to imminent lawless action.
Attorneys for St. Paul argued that the ordinance only proscribed
fighting words, true threats and “conduct directed to inciting or

27. 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992).
28. Id. at 380 (quoting the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL,
MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
29. Id. at 380 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)).
30. Id. at 381. See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510.
31. See Petition for Certiorari at i, In re the Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507
(Minn. 1991); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, In re the Welfare
of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991); Brief for Petitioner at i, R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675); Brief for Respondent at i, R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675).
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producing imminent lawless action.”32 Therefore, they argued, the
ordinance is neither vague nor overbroad.
Under Minnesota law, the attorneys argued, a true threat need
not be conveyed directly and in person, but is “a declaration of an
33
intention to injure another.” It must be made so that it supports the
inference that a threat was intended. “Based on its historical and
cultural subtext,” they argued, “the burning of a cross under
circumstances where it is aimed against one or a group of victims is
34
such a threat.” The conduct, they continued, is directed at inciting or
35
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to do just that. The
36
only question is whether the threat is clear and present. To an
African American, such a threat is not “remotely ambiguous.” The
“reasonable and inevitable belief” of a person targeted by a cross
burning is that further injury or death is likely unless the victim leaves
37
the neighborhood.
Attorneys for R.A.V. disagreed. They argued that the ordinance
was overbroad, that it regulated protected expressive conduct, and
38
that it was not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.
39
The attorneys conceded that “fighting words” and “incitement to
40
imminent lawless action” may be regulated under the First
Amendment, but argued that neither type of expression was
implicated by the St. Paul ordinance. Under the fighting words
doctrine, they argued, the offensive language must be extremely
personally offensive and must be uttered in a face-to-face manner to a
41
specific individual rather than to a group. In addition, they argued,
it’s not enough that there is a possibility that speech will provoke
42
violence; there must be an immediate threat of violence. Similarly,
while imminent lawless action may be regulated, advocating violence

32. Brief for Respondent, supra note 31, at 5.
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 22.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 4-7.
39. Id. at 27.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Id. at 27 (citing Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973); Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972)).
42. Id. at 28 (citing Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974)).
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in the abstract is not enough—there must be advocacy for the lawless
43
violence to occur immediately.
The amicus briefs filed in the case, for the most part, advanced
one of these two positions—either that the ordinance was overbroad
and vague in its approach to regulating fighting words and advocacy
of imminent lawless action, or that the ordinance had been
sufficiently narrowed on these two points by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. The Anti-Defamation League, for example, argued that the
ordinance only prohibits fighting words or conduct directed at inciting
44
imminent lawless action. “A late-night cross burning in a black
family’s yard is an act of violence, terror, harassment and
45
intimidation,” the League’s brief argued. The American Civil
Liberties Union, on the other hand, took the approach that, while
46
some expression, like threats, could be proscribed, the St. Paul
47
ordinance remained overbroad. The ACLU also argued that the
ordinance went beyond proscribing threats or imminent lawless
behavior—it proscribed expression that, while obnoxious, was
48
protected.
The nature of R.A.V.’s expressive conduct—was it fighting
words, a true threat, or an incitement to imminent lawless action—
and whether the St. Paul law had been sufficiently narrowed so that it
addressed only those forms of expression were also raised at oral
arguments. Indeed, the first questions posed to Edward J. Cleary,
R.A.V.’s attorney, seemed to chide him because his brief had not
focused more directly on the question at hand, which was “the statute

43. Id. at 29 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam)).
44. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League at 2, R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae The Asian
American Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. at 5, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 464
N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Center for Democratic
Renewal et al. at 2-3, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675);
Brief of Amicus Curiae The State of Minnesota et al. at 4, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 464
N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675); Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People et al. at 12-13, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d
507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675); Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers et al. at 2, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675);
Brief of Amicus Curiae People for the American Way at 10, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 464
N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 18, R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (90-7675).
47. Id. at 5-6, 19.
48. Id. at 21-22.

276

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:269

as the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted it[.]”49 From there,
questions quickly focused on how fighting words are defined and
whether states can proscribe words that cause fear for one’s safety
50
“even if the fear is for some act that will occur 24, 48 hours later.”
51
Cleary said they could. The Court then wanted Cleary to discuss the
52
possible distinction made in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire between
53
words that cause a breach of the peace and “words that injure.”
Under questioning by the justices, Cleary admitted that he was
arguing that the Chaplinsky reference to “words that injure” was, in
54
fact, “an erroneous reference” that the Court should disavow.
The bulk of the argument by St. Paul’s attorney, Thomas J.
Foley, was that the Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted the
ordinance to prohibit only conduct that inflicts injury, tends to incite
an immediate breach of the peace or provokes imminent lawless
55
action. Justices seemed to be concerned about the fact that the
ordinance only prohibited certain types of expression aimed at certain
groups. Because of the distinction, one justice noted, the ordinance
56
seemed to be content-based. Foley disagreed, but argued that, even
if the Court found the law to be content-based, “[T]here is a
compelling state purpose in public safety and order and safety of their
57
citizens for the city of St. Paul to pass such an ordinance.”
The stage was set, then, for the Court to consider cross burning
under the parameters of fighting words, true threats or incitement to
imminent violence.
B.

Justice Scalia for the Court

But Justice Antonin Scalia took a different route. He skirted the
issue of overbreadth and all but ignored the issue of the nature of the

49. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Dec. 4, 1991 (No. 907675).
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id.
52. 315 U.S. 568 (1949).
53. In Chaplinsky, the Court held that fighting words are not protected by the First
Amendment, and defined “fighting words” as “those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
54. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 7-8.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Content-based restrictions on speech are presumed to be unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). See also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying
text; infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
57. Transcript of Oral Arguments, supra note 49, at 16.
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expression—whether it constituted fighting words, a true threat or an
incitement to imminent violence. He noted that the Court was bound
by the construction given to the St. Paul ordinance by the Minnesota
Supreme Court and, therefore, accepted the lower court’s assertion
58
that the ordinance reached only fighting words. Justice Scalia did not
mention the other forms of proscribable speech that had been
prevalent in briefs and oral arguments—threats and advocacy of
imminent lawless action. Despite accepting Minnesota’s assertion that
the St. Paul ordinance only addressed fighting words, however,
Justice Scalia wrote that it was still unconstitutional because “it
prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the
59
subjects the speech addresses.”
Then he launched into a new area of free expression law.
While the general proposition of the Court has always been that
60
“content-based regulations are presumptively invalid,” Scalia wrote,
it is equally true that some “areas of speech can, consistently with the
First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally
61
proscribable content.” Obscenity and defamation are two examples.
Even though the Court has indicated that certain categories of
expression are not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech, Scalia wrote, “Such statements must be taken in context” and
62
are not “literally true.”
Based on that proposition, Scalia advanced a second proposition,
namely that speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature
but not on the basis of another. Such a proposition, he wrote, “is
63
commonplace and has found application in many contexts.” That
means, for example, that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance
against outdoor burning could be punishable, while burning a flag in
violation of an ordinance prohibiting the dishonoring of the flag could
64
not. Similarly, time, place and manner restrictions on speech have
65
been upheld as constitutional. And, Scalia wrote, that also means
that fighting words can be restricted, not based upon the content of
the message they convey, but because of their “nonspeech” elements.
“Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is, . .
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 386.
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‘a mode of speech;’ both can be used to convey an idea; but neither
66
has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First Amendment.” The Court
never said, Scalia wrote, that fighting words constitute “no part of the
expression of ideas, but only that they constitute ‘no essential part of
67
any exposition of ideas.’”
But Scalia also noted that the prohibition against content
68
discrimination is not absolute. The rationale for the prohibition is
that content discrimination raises the specter that the government
69
may drive some viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas. But
content discrimination among various instances of a class of
70
proscribable speech often does not pose that threat, he wrote.
Justice Scalia then delineated three supposed exceptions to the
general prohibition against content discrimination. Although he did
not enumerate his exceptions, they have become a sort of test some
lower appellate courts have appropriated in deciding cross-burning
71
cases.
First, Scalia wrote, when the basis for content discrimination
consists “entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue
is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
72
discrimination exists.” A state, therefore, may prohibit only the most
patently offensive types of obscenity, even though punishment is
allowed for the publication of any material that is deemed obscene.
But, the state may not punish only obscene material that contains
73
certain political messages. Similarly, the federal government can
criminalize threats of violence directed against the President, but may
not criminalize only those threats that mention the President’s
74
various policies.
A second exception to the general rule that content-based
regulations are prohibited, Justice Scalia wrote, is when speech is

66. Id.
67. Id. at 385 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))
(emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 387.
69. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991)).
70. Id. at 388.
71. See, e.g., Maryland v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 760-61 (Md. 1993); New Jersey v.
Vawter, 642 A.2d 349, 357-59 (N.J. 1994). Indeed, members of the Court have adopted the
exceptions as well. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361-62 (2003); id. at 381-82 (Souter,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
72. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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associated with particular secondary effects caused by the speech, so
that the regulation is justified without reference to the content of the
75
speech but to control the secondary effects. For example, he wrote, a
state could permit all obscene live performances except those
involving minors. The purpose of the regulation would be the
secondary effect of protecting minors. In addition, he wrote, a
particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech
can sometimes be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute
76
directed at conduct rather than at speech.
Finally, Justice Scalia wrote that an exception to the general rule
that content-based regulations are unconstitutional occurs when
“there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot.” As a result, “[T]he regulation of ‘fighting words,’ like the
regulation of noisy speech, may address some offensive instances and
77
leave other, equally offensive, instances alone.”
The effect of the opinion is that the government could choose
not to proscribe subcategories of proscribable speech even though the
larger categories had been determined to lay outside the protection of
the First Amendment. Justice Scalia, therefore, was abandoning the
so-called “categorical” approach of free speech jurisprudence.
Justice Scalia then applied those principles to the St. Paul
ordinance and found it unconstitutional because it discriminated
against certain groups of people, even though it may have been
narrowly construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In short, it did
not fit any of the exceptions. Wrote Justice Scalia:
Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or
severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the
specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use “fighting words”
in connection with other ideas—to express hostility, for example,
on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality—are not covered. The First Amendment does not
permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers
78
who express views on disfavored subjects.

The St. Paul ordinance, Scalia wrote, is not aimed at certain
79
groups, but rather at certain messages that are aimed at groups. It is
the obligation of the government, Scalia wrote, to confront hatred
based on virulent notions of racial supremacy, “[B]ut the manner of
that confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations upon speech
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
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. . . The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences
must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the
80
basis of its content.”
Fighting words are prohibited, Scalia noted, not because of any
particular ideas they convey, but because their content embodies a
particularly intolerable mode of expressing ideas. St. Paul, he wrote,
has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression—such
as threats—but has proscribed language that communicates messages
of racial, gender or religious intolerance. “Selectivity of this sort
creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the
expression of particular ideas,” he wrote. “That possibility would
81
alone be enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid.”
C.

A “Transparently Wrong” Opinion

Four justices—though agreeing that R.A.V.’s conviction should
be overturned—took issue with the majority for “cast[ing] aside longestablished First Amendment doctrine without the benefit of briefing
and adopt[ing] an untried theory. This is hardly a judicious way of
proceeding,” Justice Byron White wrote in an opinion concurring in
the judgment, “and the Court’s reasoning in reaching its result is
82
transparently wrong.” The Court, wrote Justice White, joined by
Justices Harry Blackmun, Sandra Day O’Connor and John Paul
Stevens, should have found the St. Paul ordinance fatally overbroad
because it criminalizes not only unprotected expression but protected
83
expression as well. Instead, he wrote, the Court “[H]olds the
ordinance facially unconstitutional on a ground that was never
presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court, a ground that has not
been briefed by the parties before this Court, a ground that requires
84
serious departures from the teaching of prior cases . . . ”
Justice White criticized Justice Scalia for abandoning the
categorical approach to free speech jurisprudence. The Court, he
wrote, has “plainly stated that expression falling within certain limited
85
categories” is not protected by the First Amendment because the
86
expressive content “is worthless or of de minimis value to society.”
80. Id.
81. Id. at 393-94.
82. Id. at 398 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
83. Id. at 397 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
84. Id. at 398 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)) (White, J., concurring
in judgment).
85. Id. at 399 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
86. Id. at 400 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
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The R.A.V. Court, however, Justice White wrote, “announces that
earlier Courts did not mean their repeated statements that certain
categories of expression are ‘not within the area of constitutionally
87
protected speech.” But, he added, “To the contrary, those
statements meant precisely what they said: The categorical approach
88
is a firmly entrenched part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”
Justice White wrote that it was inconsistent to hold that the
government could proscribe an entire category of speech because of
its content, but could not treat a subset of that category differently
without violating the First Amendment. “[T]he content of the
subset,” he wrote, “is by definition worthless and undeserving of
89
constitutional protection.” The implication in the majority opinion
that fighting words could be categorized as a form of debate
particularly rankled Justice White. By so categorizing, he wrote,
“[T]he majority legitimates hate speech as a form of public
90
discussion.”
Justice White also criticized the majority for what he called “a
general renunciation of strict scrutiny review,” which he called “a
91
fundamental tool of First Amendment analysis.” And the Court
provided no reasoned basis for discarding strict scrutiny analysis in
92
R.A.V. The St. Paul ordinance, Justice White wrote, if it were not
overbroad, would certainly pass such review. It proscribes a subset of
fighting words—those that injure on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender, an interest even the majority concedes is
93
compelling —and the ban is on “a class of speech that conveys an
94
overriding message of personal injury and imminent violence.”

87. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment).
88. Id. (White, J., concurring in judgment).
89. Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
90. Id. at 402 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
91. Id. at 404 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Justice White pointed out that two
of the five justices who joined Justice Scalia’s opinion had also joined the plurality opinion
in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), handed down less than a month before R.A.V.,
and which affirmed the strict scrutiny standard applied in a case involving a First
Amendment challenge to a content-based statute. Id. at 398 (citing Burson, 504 U.S. at
198) (White, J., concurring in judgment). Burson was delivered May 26, 1992; R.A.V. was
delivered June 22, 1992.
92. Id. at 406 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
93. Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
94. Id. at 408 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
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Justice White wrote that the case should be settled on grounds
95
that the ordinance is overbroad, because it reaches categories of
96
speech that are constitutionally protected.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens also wrote opinions concurring in
the judgment.
Justice Blackmun, writing alone, was not as passionate as Justice
White, but was just as condemning. “The majority opinion signals one
of two possibilities,” he wrote. “It will serve as precedent for future
97
cases, or it will not. Either result is disheartening.” The majority
opinion, he wrote, abandons the categorical approach to restricting
speech and relaxes the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based
laws, “setting law and logic on their heels.” This weakens the
traditional protections of speech, because, “If all expressive activity
must be accorded the same protection, that protection will be scant.
The simple reality is that the Court will never provide child
pornography or cigarette advertising the level of protection
98
customarily granted political speech.”
Second, the case may be viewed as an aberration: “a case where
the Court manipulated doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose
premise it opposed, namely, that racial threats and verbal assaults are
99
of greater harm than other fighting words.” The Court, Justice
Blackmun wrote, may have been distracted from its proper mission
by the temptation to decide the issue over “politically correct speech”
and “cultural diversity,” neither question of which was presented. “If
this is the meaning of today’s opinion,” he wrote, “it is perhaps even
100
more regrettable.” Concluded Justice Blackmun:
I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a law
that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes
by burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in
preventing the people of Saint Paul from specifically punishing the
race-based fighting words that so prejudice their community. I
concur in the judgment, however, because . . . this particular
ordinance reaches beyond fighting words to speech protected by
101
the First Amendment.

Justice Stevens, joined in part by Justices White and Blackmun,
took issue with the opinions of both Justice Scalia and Justice White.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 411 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 413 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 415-16. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 416. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
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Justice Stevens wrote that threatening a person because of the
person’s race or religious beliefs could be punished for the trauma it
causes, just as lighting a fire near an ammunition dump could be
102
punished. And, agreeing with Justice White, he wrote that the St.
103
Paul ordinance was unconstitutional because it was overbroad. But,
he added, he was writing separately “to suggest how the allure of
absolute principles has skewed the analysis of both the majority and
104
Justice White’s opinions.”
Justice Stevens indicated that the majority’s fatal flaw is that its
central premise—that content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid—“has simplistic appeal, but lacks support in our First
105
Amendment jurisprudence.” While the Court has often stated that
premise, it has also recognized that a number of types of speech can
be restricted based on their content—obscenity, child pornography
106
and fighting words, for example. The Court, then, disregards a “vast
body of case law” and applies a new type of “prohibition on contentbased regulation to speech that the Court had until today considered
wholly ‘unprotected’ by the First Amendment—namely, fighting
words. This new absolutism in the prohibition of content-based
regulations severely contorts the fabric of settled First Amendment
107
law.”
Justice Stevens also wrote that he had problems with the
“categorical approach” advocated by Justice White. While the
approach has some appeal—“the categories create safe harbors for
governments and speakers alike”—it “sacrifices subtlety for clarity
108
and is, I am convinced, ultimately unsound.” Therefore, Justice
Stevens wrote, “Unlike the Court, I do not believe that all contentbased regulations are equally infirm and presumptively invalid; unlike
Justice White, I do not believe that fighting words are wholly
109
unprotected by the First Amendment.” The decisions of the Court,
he wrote, “establish a more complex and subtle analysis . . . that
considers the content and context of the regulated speech, and the
110
nature and scope of the restriction on speech.” Under such an

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 416-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 425 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
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approach, he concluded, a “selective, subject-matter regulation,” like
111
that of St. Paul, is constitutional.
Justice Stevens wrote that he assumes, as does the Court, that the
112
St. Paul ordinance regulates only fighting words. It “regulates
speech, not on the basis of its subject matter or viewpoint expressed,
but rather on the basis of the harm [it] causes,” that is, speech that the
113
The ordinance, therefore,
speaker knows will inflict injury.
resembles a law prohibiting child pornography, an ordinance
114
regulating speech because of the harm it could cause.
But, Justice Stevens wrote, even if the ordinance regulated
fighting words based on their subject matter, it would be
115
constitutional. The ordinance does not prohibit “advocates of
tolerance and advocates of intolerance” from “hurling fighting words
at the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas,” but on the basis of
the target’s race, color, creed, religion or gender. In effect it prohibits
116
“below the belt” punches, favoring neither side. The ordinance is
also narrow and does not “raise the specter” that the government
117
might “drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”
In sum, Justice Stevens wrote, the ordinance would be
118
constitutional were it not overbroad.

II. Cross Burning in Lower Appellate Courts
Both the United States government and various states continued
to punish cross burning despite the Court’s decision in R.A.V., but by
use of different approaches. Most states enforced statutes that, to one
degree or another, prohibited the act of burning a cross. The federal
government, on the other hand, punished cross burning as part of a
broader attempt by a criminal perpetrator to restrict an individual’s
civil rights, specifically, the right to inhabit a dwelling free from fear
119
due to threatening behavior.

111. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgement).
112. Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
113. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
114. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
115. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
116. Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
117. Id. at 436 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
118. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
119. The prosecutions are generally based upon alleged violations of, among other
statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2003) (prohibiting conspiracies to “injure, oppress, threaten or
intimidate” a person who is attempting to exercise that person’s rights), 18 U.S.C. §
844(h)(1) (2003) (prohibiting the use of fire or explosives in the commission of a felony)
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A. Federal Prosecutions for Cross Burning

The federal government has clearly been more successful in
prosecuting defendants who burned crosses as part of protests than
have state governments. Of five cases prosecuted for violation of
various civil rights or fair housing laws, in only one did a federal
appellate court overturn a conviction, and in that case the court left
120
the door open for a retrial based on the cross burning. In Lee v.
121
United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed a conviction for conspiracy, but reversed a conviction
for using fire in the commission of a felony. The court, which had
122
affirmed similar convictions in other cases, provided a framework
whereby a conviction of Bruce Roy Lee could be affirmed. Had the
judge instructed the jury that expression could be punished if it was
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action,” and if the jury had convicted
123
under that standard, the conviction could be affirmed. The court
held that Lee’s action could be interpreted as an action designed to
advocate the use of force or violence and was likely to produce such a
124
result.
The four other cross-burning convictions that reached the federal
125
appellate courts since R.A.V. were much more clear-cut.
and 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) (2003) (prohibiting the interference with the right of a person to
purchase, rent or occupy a dwelling because of the person’s race).
120. The four cases in which convictions were upheld were United States v. Stewart,
65 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241
(7th Cir. 1993). See discussion accompanying infra notes 126-48.
121. 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993).
122. See cases cited at supra note 120, and infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
123. 6 F.3d at 1302 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969)).
124. Id. at 1303.
125. At least two other cases in which defendants were charged with similar crimes
reached federal appellate courts but are not considered here. In Munger v. United States,
827 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), a criminal defendant burned a cross as part of what the
court called a “terroristic and racially motivated assault.” Id. at 105. In that case, however,
the defendant was charged with interference with housing rights and assault. The court
held that the case was not a cross-burning case: “That petitioner chose to burn a cross
during his terroristic and racially motivated assault on the victim offers him no protection
from the force of the statute.” Id. The nature of the defendant’s criminal conduct, the
court held, was not addressed in R.A.V. Id. at 105-06. United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d
1306 (10th Cir. 2001), was a cross-burning case, but the defendant did not appeal on First
Amendment grounds. Michael B. Magleby appealed on various procedural grounds,
including the argument that the government could not prove that his burning of a cross in
the yard of a racially mixed couple was done with the requisite requirement that his action
was racially motivated. Id. at 1312-13. Magleby argued that he abandoned his attempt to
burn the cross in the yard of his initial victim when too many people were gathered at that
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In two cases, defendants were charged with interference with the
housing rights of another and use of fire in commission of a federal
126
127
felony. In United States v. Hayward, the Seventh U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals found the purpose of the law was “to protect the
right of an individual to associate freely in his home with anyone,
128
regardless of race.” The law, therefore, is aimed at prohibiting
129
intimidating acts, not at prohibiting expressive conduct. The fact
that the defendants may have used expressive conduct to achieve the
goal of intimidation does not bring the action within the protection of
130
the First Amendment under R.A.V., the court held. The defendants,
in the middle of the night, had burned two crosses in the yard of a
white family, apparently because members of the family frequently
131
had black guests in the home. Applying the intermediate scrutiny
132
test enunciated in United States v. O’Brien, the court held that “the
incidental restrictions on the alleged First Amendment rights in this
case are no greater than is necessary to further the government’s valid
interest of protecting the rights” of individuals to associated freely
133
with whomever they choose.
The Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar
134
conclusion two years later. In United States v. Stewart, the court
found the statutes under which the defendants were convicted to be
135
facially valid and neither overbroad nor vague. In addition, the

home, and he only burned the cross in the yard of the second victim on the guidance of
one of his co-defendants. Id. at 1309. He did not know the race of the eventual victims, he
argued, so the government could not meet its burden of proof. Id. at 1312. The court
disagreed, finding sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Magleby targeted the eventual victims because of their race. Id. at 1313.
126. In addition to the First Amendment challenge, the court, in one case, rejected
arguments by counsel for the defendants that the statute prohibiting the use of fire in the
commission of a felony was limited to the prosecution of arson cases. United States v.
Hawyard, 6 F.3d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir. 1993). The court found nothing in the language to so
limit the statute. Id.
127. 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993).
128. Id. at 1250.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1251.
131. Id. at 1244.
132. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (Is the regulation within the constitutional power of the
government; does it further an important or substantial governmental interest; is the
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression; is the incidental restriction on
First Amendment freedoms no greater than essential to further the governmental
interest?).
133. 6 F.3d at 1251.
134. 65 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 1995).
135. Id. at 929.
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court found that the conduct was not protected under R.A.V.136 The
defendants had burned a cross in the yard of Linda and Isaiah Ruffin,
a black couple with two young daughters, who had recently moved
137
into a nearly all-white community. During the incident, which took
place in the middle of the night, there was also an altercation between
138
Isaiah Ruffin and the defendants. Therefore, the court noted, the
cross burning was more than an act of expression:
The act of burning the cross . . . was an expression of the
defendant’s hatred of blacks, just as the act of killing is sometimes
an expression of a murder’s hatred of the victim. Because we
punish the act and not the opinion or belief which motivated it, the
cross burning in this case was not protected by the First
Amendment, just as a murder would not have been protected in
similar circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that some Klan
cross burnings may constitute protected expression, these
defendants did not burn their cross simply to make a political
statement. The evidence clearly shows that the defendants intended
139
to threaten and intimidate the Ruffins with this cross burning.

The law’s requirement that there must be an intent to
intimidate—as there was in this case—insulates the statute from
140
constitutional challenge, the court held.
Two more cases, both out of the Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals and one involving the same juvenile whose conviction was
overturned in R.A.V., further demonstrate the federal government’s
success in prosecuting defendants who burned crosses. R.A.V. and
two other juveniles were convicted of violating laws prohibiting the
interference with federal housing rights by burning crosses in the
141
yards of three families. The Eighth Circuit held that the critical
issue in the case was whether the cross burnings “were intended as
threats, rather than as merely obnoxious, but protected, political
142
143
statements.” The court held that they were and, therefore,
“[E]ven though these acts may have expressive content, the First
144
Amendment does not shield them from prosecution.”

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 929-30.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 921-22.
Id. at 930.
Id.
United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 826.
Id. at 828.
Id.
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Similarly, in United States v. McDermott,145 the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the convictions of two defendants who culminated 18
months of wielding baseball bats, axe handles and knives, throwing
rocks and bottles, veering cars toward and chasing black persons by
146
burning a 15-foot cross. The court held that the cross burning by
William and Daniel McDermott was “merely the final act” in a
147
“threatening course of conduct,” and, therefore, that the jury did
148
not base its conviction solely on that act.
B.

State Prosecutions for Cross Burning

State officials have had considerably less success prosecuting
cross burning. Since R.A.V., six state courts have ruled in cross149
Supreme courts in New Jersey150 and South
burning cases.
151
and the court of appeals in Maryland152 overruled
Carolina
convictions because cross burning was determined to be a form of
153
protected speech. Only two appellate courts—in California and
154
Florida —have held cross-burning statutes to be constitutional. One
155
of the earliest cases, Washington v. Talley, might demonstrate the
split personality with which most cross-burning cases are imbued.
In Washington, the state supreme court consolidated two cases.
In the first, David Talley was convicted of six counts of malicious
harassment in connection with activities he conducted in his yard. He
156
built a 4-foot cross, set it afire and began to “hoot and holler.” The
activity apparently frightened off a mixed-race couple who was
157
planning to purchase the house next door to Talley’s. In the second
case, Daniel Myers, Brandon Stevens and several other teenagers
burned an 8-foot cross in the yard of a black schoolmate whom they
145. 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994).
146. Id. at 405.
147. Id. at 407.
148. Id. at 408.
149. In addition to New Jersey, South Carolina, Maryland, California, Florida and
Washington, see infra notes 150-55, county courts in Pennsylvania split, one ruling that
cross burning is not a threat, Commonwealth v. Kozak, 21 Pa. D. & C. 4th 362 (Allegheny
County, 1993), the other ruling that cross burning is not protected expression,
Commonwealth v. Lower, 2 Pa. D. & C. 4th 107 (Cargon County, 1989).
150. New Jersey v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1994).
151. State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511 (S.C. 1993).
152. Maryland v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993).
153. In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
154. Florida v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
155. 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993).
156. Id. at 220.
157. Id.
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said was acting “too cool” at school. They were charged with one
158
count of malicious harassment. All three defendants challenged the
convictions on grounds that the malicious harassment statute was
159
unconstitutional.
The defendants were convicted under two sections of
Washington’s malicious harassment statute. Section 1 prohibited
actions that, based upon a person’s race, color, religion, ancestry,
national original or handicap, caused physical injury or placed a
person in fear of injury because of a variety of actions, including cross
burning. Section 2 provided that cross burning constituted a per se
160
violation of the law. The state supreme court held that Section 1 of
the law withstood constitutional scrutiny because it is aimed at
criminal conduct and only incidentally affects speech, but that Section
2 was unconstitutionally overbroad because it inhibited free speech
161
on the basis of content.
Section 1, the court held, differed from the St. Paul ordinance
because it “is aimed at criminal conduct and enhances punishment for
that conduct where the defendant chooses his or her victim because
162
of their perceived membership in a protected category.” The
statute, the court noted, is “triggered by victim selection regardless of
163
the actor’s motives or beliefs.” The second section of the law,
however, is unconstitutional because it “criminalizes symbolic speech
that expresses disfavored viewpoints in an especially offensive
164
manner.” Even if the law was construed to address only fighting
words, the court held, it would still be unconstitutional “because even
165
fighting words may not be regulated based on their content.”
Many of the themes arising in Washington also appeared in the
other cross-burning cases. The cases, then, turned, not on different
issues, but on the way courts interpreted the law as it applied to those
issues. Cases did not turn, for example, on where the cross burning
occurred. Four of the state statutes prohibited cross burning on the
property of another unless the burner had the permission of the
property owner. Courts split on the constitutionality of the statutes,

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 220-21 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080 (West 1989)).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id.
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without reference to this particular provision.166 Nor did cases turn on
whether cross burning was expressive conduct that conveyed a
powerful message. The courts were in relative agreement that cross
167
burnings convey powerful, even repugnant messages. Such actions,
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, convey a clear message:
168
“hatred, hostility, and animosity.”
From there, however, there was clear divergence by state courts
as to how cross burning and cross-burning statutes should be
interpreted.
Courts holding cross-burning statutes to be constitutional did so
because the messages conveyed were found to be more than
expression—they were determined to be conduct, that is, threats. The
Florida Court of Appeals, for example, held:
An unauthorized cross-burning by intruders in one’s own yard
constitutes a direct affront to one’s privacy and security and has
been inextricably linked in this state’s history to sudden and
precipitous violence—lynchings, shootings, whippings, mutilations,
and home-burnings. The connection between a flaming cross in the
yard and forthcoming violence is clear and direct. A more terrifying
169
symbolic threat for many Floridians would be difficult to imagine.

The California Court of Appeals agreed. A cross burning, the
court held, “does more than convey a message. It inflicts immediate
injury by subjecting the victim to fear and intimidation, and it conveys
170
a threat of future physical harm.” Indeed, the California court
found cross burning to fall into the category of speech known as “true
171
threats.” The California Court of Appeals found a “true threat” to
occur “when a reasonable person would foresee that the threat would
be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily

166. Compare Maryland v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Md. 1993) (The statute
meets none of the exceptions delineated in R.A.V. and does not survive strict scrutiny, so
it is unconstitutional.), and State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514 (S.C. 1993) (The statute is
facially unconstitutional; it limits fighting words only conveyed by a burning cross.), with
Florida v. T.B.D., 656 S.2d 479, 480-81 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (The statute is a constitutional
method of protecting individuals from threats.), and In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644,
653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (Cross burning is a form of terrorism, and the statute is
constitutional.).
167. See, e.g., Maryland, 629 A.2d at 757.
168. New Jersey v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349, 354 (N.J. 1994). See also Maryland, 629 A.2d
at 757; State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514 (S.C. 1993).
169. Florida v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
170. In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
171. Id. In Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969), the Supreme Court noted
that a threat against the president is not protected expression because it is, in fact, a threat.
See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying discussion.
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harm,”172 a definition with which the Supreme Court would seem to
agree. In Watts v. United States, the Court quoted with approval a
lower court definition of threats as voluntary utterances charged
173
“with ‘an apparent determination to carry them into execution.’”
New Jersey law also prohibits actions that constitute threats, but
the state supreme court held that the law did not prohibit only
threats; the law also proscribed “expressions of contempt and
174
hatred,” expressions that, while contemptible, are protected. The
law, therefore, was unconstitutional.
175
176
Florida and California found cross burning to fall under the
category of “fighting words.” In so doing, the California Court of
Appeals called upon the language from Chaplinsky proscribing words
that inflict injury. “The typical act of malicious cross burning is not
done in the victim’s immediate physical presence and thus does not
177
tend to incite an immediate fight,” the court held. But, the court
added, “[T]he fighting words doctrine encompasses expressive
178
conduct that by its very commission inflicts injury.”
Of the courts finding cross-burning statutes to be
unconstitutional, only the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed
the fighting words issue, and that court held that the statute in
question was discriminatory—like that of St. Paul—because it did not
prohibit the use of fighting words, but only “the use of those fighting
179
words symbolically conveyed by a burning cross.” Though Florida’s
cross-burning statute contained language that was virtually identical
180
to that of South Carolina, that state’s supreme court found the
statute to be content neutral because it was not limited to any favored

172. 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647.
173. 394 U.S. at 707 (quoting Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir.
1918)).
174. New Jersey v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349, 359 (N.J. 1994).
175. See Florida v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
176. See In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
177. In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648.
178. Id.
179. State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514 (S.C. 1993).
180. The South Carolina statute prohibits the placing of “a burning or flaming cross”
or any exhibit containing such a cross, real or simulated without the permission of the
property owner. Id. at 513 n.1 (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 16-7-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
The Florida statute makes it unlawful for anyone “to place or cause to be placed on the
property of another in the state a burning or flaming cross or any manner of exhibit in
which a burning or flaming cross, real or simulated, is a whole or part without first
obtaining written permission” of the property owner or resident. Florida, 656 So. 2d at 480
(quoting Fla. Stat. Ann. § 876.18 (1993)).
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topics. In addition, the Florida court found that the cross-burning
181
statute was not overbroad.
182
In both Maryland and New Jersey,183 appellate courts found the
cross-burning statutes did not survive strict scrutiny. In addition, each
court examined the respective state law against the three exceptions
supposedly advanced by Justice Scalia in R.A.V., and found that the
law did not meet any of the exceptions.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the state’s crossburning law suffered from the same deficiencies as the ordinance
184
struck down in R.A.V.
The Maryland Court of Appeals found cross burning to be
185
odious and cowardly, but, nevertheless, expressive conduct. In
addition, since there was no way to justify the cross-burning statute
“without referring to the substance of speech it regulates,” the statute
186
was not content neutral and was subject to strict scrutiny. The
statute, the court held, is not necessary to serve the state’s asserted
187
interest. While protecting the social welfare of its citizens is a
compelling state interest, the court held, “[T]he Constitution does not
allow the unnecessary trammeling of free expression even for the
noblest of purposes,” and the cross-burning law “cannot be deemed
188
‘necessary’ to the State’s effort to foster racial and religious accord.”
Before either state addressed the issue of strict scrutiny,
however, each applied the three exceptions to the prohibition against
content discrimination delineated by Scalia and held that the
exceptions did not apply. Both did so reluctantly. The New Jersey
high court specifically criticized the holding: “Although we are frank
to confess that our reasoning in that case would have differed from
Justice Scalia’s, we recognize our inflexible obligation to review the
189
constitutionality of our own statutes using his premises.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state laws in
question did not fit into any of the three exceptions delineated by

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Florida, 656 So. 2d at 482.
See Maryland v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Md. 1993).
See New Jersey v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349, 359-60 (N.J. 1994).
Id. at 359-60.
Maryland, 629 A.2d at 758.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 763.
New Jersey, 642 A.2d at 358.
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Justice Scalia in R.A.V.190 First, they did not prohibit only threats, but
also prohibited expressions of contempt and hatred—expressions that
might be obnoxious, but are not illegal. And they suffered from the
191
same deficiencies as R.A.V. Second, whatever secondary effects the
laws might target were the same as those targeted by R.A.V., so the
192
laws suffered from the same deficiencies as the St. Paul ordinance.
Finally, the legislative history of the laws indicates that they were
passed specifically to outlaw messages of religious or racial hatred, so
the argument that no official suppression of ideas is afoot cannot
193
survive.
The Maryland Court of Appeals went through a similar
194
machination, arriving at the same conclusion.

III. Virginia v. Black
The Virginia Supreme Court consolidated three cases for
195
decision in Black v. Commonwealth. Elliott v. Commonwealth and
196
O’Mara v. Commonwealth grew out of an incident involving the
burning of a cross in the yard of David Targee, a neighbor of Richard
J. Elliott, May 2, 1998. At a party, Elliott apparently complained
about a disagreement between himself and Targee and suggested that
197
a cross be burned in Targee’s yard in retaliation. Elliott was
convicted of attempted cross burning, was sentenced to 90 days in jail
198
and was fined $2,500. Jonathan O’Mara pleaded guilty to attempted
cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross burning and received
199
the same sentence. Both men appealed, and both convictions were
200
upheld by the Virginia Court of Appeals.
The case involving Barry Elton Black arose from a Ku Klux Klan
rally August 22, 1998, in Carroll County, Virginia. The cross was
burned in an open field that belonged to Annabell Sechrist, who
participated in the rally. Though the property on which the cross was

190. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 333, 388-90 (1992). See also supra notes 71-77 and
accompanying text.
191. New Jersey, 642 A.2d at 359.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Maryland, 629 A.2d at 760-61 (Md. 1993).
195. 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001).
196. 535 S.E.2d 175 (Va. App. 2000).
197. 553 S.E.2d at 740.
198. Id. at 741.
199. Id. at 740.
200. 535 S.E.2d at 181.
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burned was private, it was visible from a public highway and from
201
nearby homes. Black was convicted of violating Virginia’s crossburning statute and was fined $2,500. His conviction was also
202
affirmed.
The statute the three men were convicted of violating prohibited
“any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or
group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
203
property of another, a highway or other public place.” The law also
provided that “any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie
204
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”
Black argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it
engaged in viewpoint and content discrimination. He also contended
that the provision permitting the inference of an intent to intimidate
from the act of burning a cross excused the state from its burden of
205
proving a prima facie case.
A. The Virginia Supreme Court Ruling

The Virginia Supreme Court found R.A.V. controlling. The
Virginia statute, the court held, was “analytically indistinguishable”
206
from the St. Paul ordinance. The state’s argument that the Virginia
statute was constitutional because it did not discriminate, as did the
St. Paul statute, and because the R.A.V. Court noted that threats of
violence are outside First Amendment protection “distorts the
207
holding of R.A.V.,” the court held. A statute punishing intimidation
or threats based solely upon a content-focused category—such as race
or religion—of otherwise protected speech, the court held, violates
208
the First Amendment. The court quoted heavily from those
portions of R.A.V. in which Justice Scalia described the categories
209
and sub-categories of speech that might be protected —the portions

201. 553 S.E.2d at 748 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 741.
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1983). The law has been changed. In its 2002
term, the Virginia General Assembly amended the law so that it is now a crime for a
person to burn any object, regardless of shape, on the property of another person without
permission or to burn any object “on a highway or other public place in a manner having a
direct tendency to place another person in reasonable fear or apprehension of death or
bodily injury.” VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423.01 (Michie 2002).
204. Id.
205. 553 S.E.2d at 741.
206. Id. at 742.
207. Id. at 743.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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of the opinion with which Justice White took particular exception.210
“R.A.V. makes it abundantly clear that, while certain areas of speech
and expressive conduct may be subject to proscription, regulation
within these areas must not discriminate based upon the content of
211
the message,” wrote Judge Donald W. Lemons for the majority.
The absence of language referring to race does not save the
statute, the court held: “The virulent symbolism of cross burning has
been discussed in so many judicial opinions that its subject and
212
content as symbolic speech has been universally acknowledged,”
and those who burn crosses, “do so fully cognizant of the
213
controversial racial and religious messages which such acts impart.”
In addition, the court noted, the Virginia statute was aimed
specifically at regulating content rather than any secondary effects
214
that cross burning might cause.
The Virginia Supreme Court then turned to Justice White’s
opinion concurring in the judgment to find the state law overbroad.
Using the opinion as a basis, the court found the state law “sweeps
within its ambit for arrest and prosecution, both protected and
unprotected speech” and, therefore, is unconstitutionally
215
overbroad.
Three judges dissented, complaining that the state has the
authority to punish an act “that intentionally places another person in
216
fear of bodily harm,” as cross burning does.
In a concurring opinion written solely to respond to the dissent,
however, Judge Cynthia D. Kinser wrote that the dissent was
mistaken in its efforts to equate “an intent to intimidate” with a true
217
threat or a “physical act intended to inflict bodily harm.” Even if the
dissent were correct in its assertion that the Virginia statute
proscribes only conduct that constitutes true threats, the state still
“cannot engage in content discrimination by selectively prohibiting
218
only those ‘true threats’ that convey a particular message.”
210. See discussion accompanying supra notes 85-90.
211. 553 S.E.2d at 743.
212. Id. at 744.
213. Id. at 745.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 746.
216. Id. at 748 (Hassell, J., dissenting) (joined by Carrico, C.J., Koontz, J.). As a point
of interest, Judge Hassell became the first African American chief justice of the Virginia
Supreme Court on Feb. 11, 2003. See Alan Cooper, Hassell Sworn in as Chief Justice;
Historic Moment at Supreme Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 2003, at A1.
217. Id. at 747 (Kinser, J., concurring).
218. Id. (Kinser, J., concurring).
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Before the U.S. Supreme Court

A common thread running through the cross-burning cases—and
through briefs filed in Black and oral arguments, as well—was the
issue of intimidation. Virginia, supported by at least four amicus
briefs, including one from the Solicitor General of the United
219
States, took the position that the government has the authority to
proscribe intimidating speech. Attorneys for Black, Elliott, and
220
O’Mara, on the other hand, along with their amici, argued that cross
burning, even if it is intimidating speech, does not rise to a level that
would require the serious damage to First Amendment rights that
punishing the expressive conduct would cause.
It would seem, therefore, a key question was how much
intimidation is too much for the First Amendment?
The brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center was the only one that
made the argument that a distinction should be made between
language that is intimidating and language that is threatening, though
the issue surfaced in the briefs filed by both the Commonwealth of
221
222
Virginia and attorneys for Black, Elliott and O’Mara. And,
indeed, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Kinser made the same point
223
in her concurring opinion. Virginia acknowledged that intimidation
224
is different from a threat, but argued that intimidating speech
225
should be regulated. The respondents, however, argued that a key
problem with the law is clear: “Admittedly, it may also be seen, in a
given time and place, as a true threat, but it cannot plausibly be
226
maintained that every act of cross burning is a threat.”

219. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation at 3, Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107); Brief of Amicus Curiae State of California at 2,
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107); Brief of the States of New Jersey et
al. at 2, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107); Brief of Amicus Curiae The
United States at 11, 26, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107). In addition,
the brief of the Anti-Defamation League indicated that it supported neither party, but the
arguments tracked those made by amici briefs supporting the commonwealth of Virginia.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League et al. at 15, Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
220. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Rutherford Institute, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003) (No. 01-1107); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Freedom of Expression, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
221. See Brief on Merits for Respondents, supra note 19, at 35-36.
222. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 14.
223. Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E. 2d 738, 747 (Va. 2001) (Kinser, J., concurring). See
supra note 215 and accompanying text.
224. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 14.
225. Id. at 24.
226. Brief on Merits for Respondents, supra note 19 at 35-36.
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Intimidation, Virginia argued, is different from both threats and
fighting words. With an epithet or, the brief implied, a threat, the
danger is likely to soon pass. Intimidation is different, the brief
argued, even though it then used the word “threat” as a synonym for
“intimidation”: “A threat to do bodily harm to an individual or his
family is likely to sink deep into the psyche of its victim, acquiring
227
Intimidations, therefore, should be
more force over time.”
proscribed.
Virginia also argued that the cross-burning statute is content
neutral because it prohibits an act that can be used to intimidate
anyone, not just persons of particular groups. “A cross burning—
standing alone and without explanation—is understood in our society
as a message of intimidation,” the brief argued, and can intimidate
228
anyone, regardless of race. Often bigotry is involved, but there is no
229
direct correlation between race and burning a cross.
Even if the statute is content-based, Virginia argued, it is
justified by the three exceptions delineated in R.A.V.: It is a
230
particularly virulent form of intimidation, it has an array of
231
232
secondary effects, and no official suppression of ideas is afoot.
Virginia “incessantly repeats the mantra” that the state law
233
requires an intent to intimidate, attorneys for Black, Elliott, and
O’Mara, countered. “But the point of R.A.V. is that it does not
234
matter.” A law banning fighting words is permissible, but not a law
banning racist fighting words. Similarly, a law banning intimidation is
permissible if the concept of intimidation is sufficiently confined, but
not a law banning intimidation through cross burning. Virginia’s
argument, the brief maintained, “collapses on itself and dissolves into
incoherence, for the statute only makes logical sense if it is construed
as driven by Virginia’s concern with what is communicated when a
235
That’s because, the brief argued, the law
cross is burned.”
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of content and
236
viewpoint. The state’s position, it continued, is that content and

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 14.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 32-34.
Id. at 37-39.
Id. at 40-41.
Brief on Merits for Respondents, supra note 19, at 11-12.
Id.
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 6.
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viewpoint discrimination reside only in the language. But such
237
discrimination can also reside in specific symbols:
Certain symbols—the American Flag, the Star of David, the Cross,
the swastika—exude powerful magnetic charges, positive and
negative, and are often invoked to express beliefs and emotions
high and low, sublime and base, from patriotism, faith, or love to
238
dissent, bigotry, or hate.

And the government may not regulate speech on the basis of its
message about such symbols, nor is the government allowed to
protect certain symbols from attack:
If the government is permitted to select one symbol for banishment
from public discourse there are few limiting principles to prevent it
from selecting others. And it is but a short step from the banning of
offending symbols such as burning crosses to the banning of
239
offending words.

Virginia cannot have it both ways, the brief asserted, by arguing
that the violent history of cross burning does not render the statute
content and viewpoint based, then arguing that cross burning is
equivalent to intimidation because of its history. The state, the brief
argued, is “ignoring the history of cross-burning in one part of its
240
argument and invoking it in the next.” The pivotal question,
therefore, was whether the law’s focus is sufficient to render it
content and viewpoint based: “And however much Virginia protests,
under our First Amendment traditions to single out for special
treatment one symbol in this manner does pose a danger that
241
suppression of ideas is afoot.”
Virginia’s position, then, was that even though intimidation is
different from threats, intimidation is a more serious form of speech
and can be punished under the Constitution. Virginia did not address
the issue that the Supreme Court has proscribed true threats, at least
when they are aimed at the President, but has allowed threatening
language aimed at the President when that language is part of
political hyperbole.
Attorneys for Black, Elliott, and O’Mara, on the other hand, also
distinguishing between threats and intimidation, argued that
intimidation that does not rise to the level of threats or fighting
words, is protected under the Constitution.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 37.
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The attorneys made essentially the same points during oral
arguments December 11, 2002. The justices seemed to be intrigued by
the nature of cross burning—was it like brandishing an automatic
242
weapon, Justice Antonin Scalia wanted to know, or like telling a
243
person “I’ll kill you,” Justice Stephen Breyer wanted to know.
Indeed, Justice Breyer eventually summed up the key question in the
case: “And so the question before us is whether burning a cross is
such a terrorizing symbol . . . in American culture that even on the
244
basis of heightened scrutiny, it’s okay to proscribe it.”
William H. Hurd, Virginia State Solicitor, and Michael R.
Dreesben, Deputy U.S. Solicitor General, told the justices, in essence,
that cross burning could be proscribed because it is tantamount to a
threat. It “is very much like brandishing a firearm,” Hurd told Justice
245
Scalia. It is “an especially virulent form of intimidation.” Cross
burning, he argued, says, “[W]e’re close at hand. We don’t just talk.
We act . . . The message is a threat of bodily harm, and . . . it is
246
unique.”
Dreeben agreed, calling cross burning “a signal to violence or a
247
warning to violence” that is not protected speech. Justice Clarence
Thomas went even further in his questioning of Dreeben, wondering
aloud whether the attorney was understating the issue. He suggested
that cross burning is “significantly greater than intimidation or a
248
threat” because “It was intended to cause fear . . . and to terrorize a
249
population.” Dreeben agreed, adding that the focus of the Virginia
statute was not on any particular message, but “on the effect of
intimidation, and the intent to create a climate of fear and . . . a
250
climate of terror.”
University of Richmond law professor Rodney A. Smolla,
however, argued that cross burning is significantly different from
brandishing a weapon or telling a person, “I’ll kill you.” Cross
burning involved symbolism rather than intimidation, he argued, and
was being proscribed because of the message it conveyed rather than

242. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, 27, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003),
Dec. 11, 2002 (No. 01-1107).
243. Id. at 41-42.
244. Id. at 37.
245. Id. at 8.
246. Id. at 16.
247. Id. at 20.
248. Id. at 22.
249. Id. at 23.
250. Id. at 24.
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any threat.251 Cross burning, Smolla said, is not a particularly virulent
form of intimidation, but, rather, is “an especially virulent form of
252
expression on ideas relating to race, religion, politics.” Restrictions
on it, therefore, are content-based. “There’s not a single interest that
society seeks to protect . . . that cannot be vindicated perfectly as well,
exactly as well with no fall-off at all by content-neutral alternatives,”
253
he argued. “It’s important to remember,” Smolla added, “that our
First Amendment jurisprudence is not just about deliberate
censorship and realized censorship. It is also about . . . chilling effect
254
and about . . . breathing space.”
C.

Justice O’Connor for the Court

The decision in Virginia v. Black was almost as splintered as that
in R.A.V. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for five members of
the Court, found that states could proscribe cross burning that was
255
designed to intimidate. Justice O’Connor, in a description of the
history of cross burning, wrote that the activity “is inextricably
256
intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan,” but that because
the Klan used cross burnings during rallies and rituals, it has had a
dual purpose: “[C]ross burnings have been used to communicate both
257
But
threats of violence and messages of shared ideology.”
regardless of whether the message is political or intimidating, she
258
wrote, “[T]he burning cross is a ‘symbol of hate.’” Therefore,
“[W]hile a burning cross does not inevitably convey a message of
intimidation, often the cross burner intends that the recipients of the
message fear for their lives. And when a cross burning is used to
259
intimidate, few if any messages are more powerful.”
It is cross burning as intimidation that may be restricted, Justice
O’Connor wrote. The First Amendment, she wrote, is designed to
protect the free trade in ideas—even ideas that the overwhelming
majority of people find distasteful or discomforting. In addition, the
First Amendment protects symbolic or expressive conduct as well as

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 40.
538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003).
Id. at 352.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 357.
Id.
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actual speech.260 It does not protect either fighting words or true
threats, however. Fighting words, she indicated, are words “‘which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
261
breach of the peace,’” and threats “encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
262
In addition, the protection from
or group of individuals.’”
threatening speech extends beyond the intent of the person issuing
the threat. “The speaker,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “need not
263
actually intend to carry out the threat.” People are protected from
the fear of violence in addition to being protected from the violence
264
itself.
Therefore, she wrote, the protection extends to intimidating
words, which are a form of true threats: “Intimidation in the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat,
where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with
265
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”
Intimidation, therefore, is designed to produce fear, and it is that
production that may be proscribed and punished.
Justice O’Connor then applied R.A.V. to the facts of Virginia v.
Black and found that Virginia could constitutionally outlaw cross
266
burnings “done with the intent to intimidate . . . ” The Court in
R.A.V., Justice O’Connor wrote, specifically held that some types of
content discrimination are allowed under the First Amendment. That
is, if an “entire class of speech” is proscribable, a jurisdiction may
constitutionally decide to proscribe only a subset of that category of
267
speech. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia
has chosen to prohibit only those intimidating messages disseminated
by means of the burning cross, and that decision does not violate the
268
Constitution. That is, “[A] State may choose to prohibit only those
forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily
269
harm.”

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 358.
Id. at 359 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
Id. (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363.
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Despite that, however, Justice O’Connor found the Virginia law
unconstitutional because it provided that any burning of a cross
would be prima facie evidence that there was an intent to intimidate.
The provision, she wrote, permits a jury to convict defendants in
every case in which they exercise their constitutional right not to put
on a defense. And, she added, even when a defendant presents a
defense, the provision “makes it more likely that the jury will find an
270
intent to intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the case.” In
some of those cases, the cross burners may be involved in “core
political speech,” Justice O’Connor wrote. Even so, the act may
arouse a sense of anger or hatred, “But this sense of anger or hatred
271
is not sufficient to ban all cross burnings.”
Justice Antonin Scalia, who agreed that states may proscribe
cross burnings that constitute intimidating speech, did not join the
portion of Justice O’Connor’s opinion striking down the law because
272
of the prima facie evidence provision. Justice David Souter, joined
by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsberg, however,
also had problems with the prima facie clause, concurring in the
273
judgment but in only part of Justice O’Connor’s opinion.
Justice Souter, writing that none of the exceptions outlined in
274
R.A.V. would save the Virginia law, agreed with Justice O’Connor
that “[T]he prima facie evidence provision stands in the way of any
275
finding” the law constitutional. The primary effect of the provision,
he wrote, would be:
[T]o skew jury deliberations toward conviction in cases where the
evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively weak and arguably
consistent with a solely ideological reason for burning. To
understand how the provision may work, recall that the symbolic
act of burning a cross, without more, is consistent with both intent
to intimidate and intent to make an ideological statement free of
276
any aim to threaten.

The plurality opinion by Justice O’Connor and the joiner by
Justice Souter, therefore, provided seven votes for the proposition
that the Virginia law was unconstitutional because of the prima facie
evidence provision.

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 368-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 380-81 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment and in part).
Id. at 381-86 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment and in part).
Id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment and in part).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in judgment and in part).
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Justice Scalia also concurred in the judgment, but in an opinion
that was only slightly less convoluted than his R.A.V. majority
opinion. Joined in part by Justice Clarence Thomas, he agreed that
the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court should be vacated, but
only so the lower court could “authoritatively construe the prima277
facie-evidence provision.” Justice Scalia found no constitutional
problem with the provision so long as defendants were given the
opportunity to rebut the presumption that there was an intent to
278
intimidate.
Finally, Justice Thomas dissented, writing, in effect, that
everyone who considered cross burning a form of speech was wrong,
so the activity could be banned in all circumstances as threatening
279
conduct.

IV. Threats and Intimidation from Schenck
to Claiborne Hardware
The Supreme Court has clearly delineated standards for those
types of speech that lie outside the protection of the First
Amendment. Obscene speech must meet the three-part test first
280
enunciated in Miller v. California. Fighting words must tend to
281
cause an immediate breach of the peace. Words constitute true
threats when there is a reasonable expectation that there will be
282
actions to follow the words. Advocacy to overthrow the government
through violence or to engage in other illegal, violent acts must be
283
specific and imminent. It’s not enough for the recipient of such
speech to be able to speculate about possible results; the advocacy
284
must be such that it is likely to cause the desired result.
The Court has established these rules of law to ensure that the
government not encroach upon valuable free speech rights in the
name of controlling obnoxious speech. Speech that is disagreeable,
hateful or even intimidating may not be restricted because someone
277. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment and in part).
278. Id. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment and in part).
279. Id. at 388-400 (Thomas, J., dissenting.)
280. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) ((a) whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest, (b) whether the work describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by applicable state law, (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value).
281. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
282. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).
283. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
284. See id.
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in government doesn’t like the nature or content of that speech.
Obscenity may be proscribed because it has been determined by the
Court to be without redeeming social value. Other forms of speech
are proscribed because their value is overridden by the physical
response they invoke; only when the speech rises to the level of action
or of causing some retaliation may it be banned.
The requirement that threatening speech must rise to the level of
action before it may be banned likely had its origins with the clear
and present danger test first enunciated by Justice Oliver Wendall
285
Holmes in Schenck v. United States. The rule provided that the
government could proscribe speech that caused a clear and present
danger of bringing about “substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.” Specifically, the Court held that the First Amendment
does not necessarily protect words “that may have all the effect of
286
force.”
The rule was reaffirmed in Abrams v. United States287 and
expanded more than twenty years later with the fighting words
288
doctrine enunciated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. Chaplinsky
provided that words which “by their very utterance inflict injury or
289
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” could be
proscribed and punished.
Then, in 1952, the Court seemed to expand the fighting words
doctrine, though it based the expansion on libel law. In a case with
elements resembling those of some cross-burning cases—specifically
R.A.V.—the Court affirmed the conviction of Joseph Beauharnais for
violating an Illinois law prohibiting a person from using language that
“‘exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to
contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the
290
peace or riots.’” Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for a Court of five
in Beauharnais v. Illinois, held that the law was “specifically directed
291
at a defined evil,” and was directed at words “liable to cause
292
violence and disorder” —language very much like that used to

285. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
286. Id. at 52.
287. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (affirming convictions under the Espionage Act for
attempting to harm the United States by hampering the war effort).
288. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
289. Id. at 571.
290. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952)(quoting Illinois Criminal Code,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, c. 38, § 471).
291. Id. at 253.
292. Id. at 254.
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support the ordinances in both R.A.V.293 and Virginia v. Black.294 In
the face of the history of race relations in the United States, Justice
Frankfurter wrote, “[W]e would deny experience to say that the
Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or
malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public
places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact
295
on those to whom it was presented.”
That same history, of course, was called upon to justify the cross296
burning statute in Virginia. And, while a public cross-burning may
not be a false defamation, it is certainly “calculated to have a
powerful emotional impact on those to whom it was presented.”
Beauharnais was never specifically repudiated by the Court, but it
297
would seem to have been nullified by R.A.V.
In 1969, the Court enunciated what became known as “the
incitement doctrine,” expanding protection for obnoxious, but
298
politically motivated speech. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court
held that the First Amendment protects speech that advocates
violence, so long as the speech is not directed at inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is not likely to incite or produce such
299
action. In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted of
violating a state law prohibiting persons from advocating the use of
terrorism to accomplish political goals. The Court said his speech
300
promising “revengeance,” however, while advocating violence, was
301
not “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” The
distinction was important. Brandenburg established the rule that, in
order for inflammatory speech to be proscribed, that speech must
advocate immediate violent action. Advocacy to “take the fucking
streets” was not an incitement, for example, because the advocacy
was not for immediate action; rather, it was for possible action some
302
time in the future.
293. See supra notes 28-30, 38-43 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
295. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 261.
296. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352-57 (2003).
297. But see 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (citing Beauharnais).
298. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
299. Id. at 447. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 509-10 (1951).
300. Id. at 446.
301. Id. at 447.
302. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam). See also Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) (“The mere teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for
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The same year it decided Brandenburg, the Court also decided
303
Watts v. United States, a case that both sides in Virginia v. Black
304
have cited as supporting various arguments. Watts provided that the
government could punish speech that constituted a “true threat”
while recognizing that not all threatening speech constituted such
threats—some was rhetorical hyperbole.
In Watts, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Robert
Watts for violating the federal law prohibiting the making of threats
against the President of the United States. The Court did not
invalidate the law, but, in a per curiam opinion, held that statements
305
by Watts did not rise to the level of a threat.
The incident in question occurred during a public rally on the
grounds of the Washington Monument. The crowd broke into
discussion groups. In one group, Watts was heard to complain about
receiving notice of his 1-A draft classification and to state that he
would refuse to be inducted into the armed forces. “I am not going,”
he was heard to say. “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
306
want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” Attorneys for Watts argued that
the statement was made during political debate, that it was
conditioned upon the induction of Watts into the armed forces, and
307
that the reaction of those who heard the statement was laughter.
The Court noted that the statute prohibiting threats against the
President is constitutional: “The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even
an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief
Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without
interference from threats of violence.” But, the Court added, “[A]
statute such as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech,
must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment
clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what is
308
The Court held that the
constitutionally protected speech.”
government must prove what it called a “true ‘threat’” in order to
convict a person under the statute. Wrote the Court:

violent action and steeling it to such action.”); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318
(1957) (There is a distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed
at promoting unlawful action.).
303. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
304. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note14, at 14, 26; Brief on Merits for Respondents,
supra note 19, passim.
305. 394 U.S. at 708.
306. Id. at 706.
307. Id. at 707.
308. Id.
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We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in
by petitioner fits within that statutory term. For we must interpret
the language Congress chose “against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
309
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”

Language used in political debate, the Court noted, is often
“vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” Watts’ only offense, therefore,
“was ‘a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political
opposition to the President.’ Taken in context, and regarding the
expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the
310
listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.”
Similarly, the Court, in 1982, held that a civil rights leader’s
speeches threatening violence against blacks who violated a boycott
of white-owned businesses may have been intimidating—or even
threatening—but was still protected speech. NAACP v. Claiborne
311
Hardware Co. began when white businessmen in Claiborne County,
Mississippi, sued a number of blacks, the NAACP and Charles Evers,
NAACP Field Secretary of Mississippi, because of a boycott Evers
312
had helped organize. In encouraging local blacks to adhere to the
boycott, Evers was reported to have said in speeches that, “‘If we
catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break
313
your damn neck.’”
The Court noted that the First Amendment protects neither
314
violence nor threats of violence, and did not take issue with a lower
court’s finding that “‘coercion, intimidation, and threats’ formed ‘part
of the boycott activity’ and ‘contributed to its almost complete
success.’” But, the Court held, to the extent that the lower court’s
judgment “rests on the ground that ‘many’ black citizens were
‘intimidated’ by ‘threats’ of ‘social ostracism, vilification, and
315
traduction,’ it is flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment.” The
entire success of the boycott, the Court held was not caused by
316
violence or threats of violence.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 708 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Id.
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Id. at 889-90.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 921.
Id.
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The Court, then, established a narrow test for allowing
prohibitions against intimidating, and even threatening, speech.
Virginia v. Black changed all that.

V. Virginia v. Black and the Re-Definition
of Intimidating Speech
The Court may have ruled that cross burning designed to express
an ideology or “shared group identity” is protected by the First
317
Amendment, but it also added “intimidation”—at least as it is
expressed through cross burning—to the family of speech categories
not protected by the First Amendment. Intimidating speech, the
Court held, “is a type of true threat where a speaker directs a threat
to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in
318
fear of bodily harm or death.”
On the surface, this bifurcated approach to cross burning appears
to make sense. The Court seems to be reaffirming the integrity of
First Amendment protection for expressive conduct while, at the
same time, affirming the more popular position that cross burning,
when directed at individuals, is a particularly heinous form of speech
that does not deserve such protection. A closer examination,
however, reveals the flaws in the Court’s reasoning and the significant
erosion in First Amendment protections that could result.
First, Justice O’Connor’s inclusion of intimidation among those
categories of speech that cannot claim First Amendment protection
makes even more ambiguous the line that separates protected and
unprotected expressive conduct. In its line of cases from Schenck
through Claiborne Hardware, the Court has made it clear that the
government can proscribe and punish speech that takes on the role of
319
action. Speech that has “all the effect of force” in its efforts to incite
320
321
322
violence, materially disrupt the operations of courts or schools,
or genuinely threaten individuals323 may be punished, regardless of
how such expression is communicated.
Intimidation, however, was a type of speech distinct and separate
from true threats, and a significant body of law supported the

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356 (2003).
Id. at 360.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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proposition that intimidating speech was not the equivalent of
threatening speech. As previously indicated, for example, the Court
has held that there is a distinction between advocating violence as an
324
abstract political tool and advocating immediate violent action.
Similarly, the Court held that advocating possible violence at some
325
point in the future was protected speech. Indeed, when NAACP
official Charles Evers threatened to break the necks of African
Americans who violated a boycott of white-owned businesses, the
Court recognized that the speech, while intimidating, was not
threatening and, therefore, was protected. “Strong and effective
extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet
phrases,” the Court held, and Evers’ speech “did not transcend the
326
bounds of protected speech . . . ” Similarly, in Watts, the Court
recognized that when “a form of pure speech” is criminalized, the law
“must be interpreted with the command of the First Amendment
327
clearly in mind.” Justice O’Connor’s history and description of cross
burning would clearly establish the conduct as a form of “pure
328
speech.” It can only be proscribed, therefore, if it rises to the level
of putting one in fear of immediate harm.
Intimidation doesn’t necessarily involve threats of immediate
harm. Indeed, the Commonwealth of Virginia argued that
intimidation and threats fell into different categories: Threats
constitute speech that intimated immediate danger; intimidation, on
the other hand, constitutes speech that is more long-lasting—speech
that “is likely to sink deep into the psyche of its victim, acquiring
329
more force over time.” The case law on regulating such speech, as
has been demonstrated, focuses on the immediate problem of
violence. Justice O’Connor’s definition of intimidation focuses, not on
330
violence, but on fear, a much more ambiguous standard.
A second problem with the opinion in Virginia v. Black—related
to the first—is that, though a majority of the justices recognize the
331
political nature of cross burning, the majority remains willing to
bifurcate First Amendment protection for such political speech. In
324. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957).
325. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam).
326. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
327. 394 U.S. at 707.
328. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352-57 (2003).
329. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 14.
330. 538 U.S. at 360.
331. See id. at 365 (plurality) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens,
Breyer, JJ.); id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, JJ.).
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striking down Virginia’s requirement that the act of cross burning
332
standing alone was prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate,
Justice O’Connor wrote that such a requirement “ignores all of the
contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular
cross burning is intended to intimidate. The First Amendment does
333
not permit such a shortcut.” Sometimes, Justice O’Connor wrote,
“the cross burning is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group
334
solidarity.” If a jury is not allowed to consider the facts of the case,
in the face of the prima facie evidence provision, the jury cannot
determine whether a cross burning is designed to intimidate or to
express an ideology.
What Justice O’Connor and her joiners failed to acknowledge,
however, was that even when a cross burning may be directed at an
individual it can be designed to express a political message. A
particular form of speech is not stripped of its political nature simply
because it is directed at an individual or group or because it may have
some additional meaning. And, indeed, such an action is not
automatically threatening or intimidating because it is so directed. To
a degree, the majority accepts the argument that simply burning a
cross is prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate. The majority
simply inserts an additional requirement—that the burning be aimed
at an individual or group. This is not to say that threatening speech—
even if it is political—should not be proscribed, only that the political
nature of the speech needs to be considered and that there are ways
of regulating such speech without classifying intimidating speech as
unprotected.
The shift by the Court to allowing proscription of intimidating
speech that may not intimate immediate harm is based, in part, on the
virulent nature of the speech. Justice O’Connor wrote that Virginia
could outlaw intimidating cross burnings because the action “is a
particularly virulent form of intimidation” and, therefore, fits into one
of the exceptions to the prohibition on content-based restrictions
335
enunciated in R.A.V. “Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of

332. Justice O’Connor’s opinion on this point received only three additional votes, but
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, wrote separately that the prima
facie evidence provision was unconstitutional. Id. at 386-87 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment).
333. 538 U.S. at 367.
334. Id. at 365-66.
335. Id. at 363.
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intimidating messages,” she wrote, “in light of cross burning’s long
336
and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.”
Justice Souter disagreed with the Court’s assessment because, he
wrote, the determination of the particularly virulent nature of cross
burning focused on the communication generally associated with the
337
message, while none of the exceptions described in R.A.V. did so.
The Court shifted the emphasis in its test to determine whether
obnoxious speech is proscribed from immediacy and a tendency to
incite, then, to virulence or the obnoxious quality of the speech. The
shift is significant given the fact that the rationale is based upon the
content of the message, not on a determination that cross burning
constitutes a true threat. A threat—regardless of the vehicle used to
convey it—can be proscribed. By allowing states to single out cross
burning from the many ways individuals can be intimidated, the
Court is inviting erosion of another longstanding judicial tradition—
that political expression receives the most stringent protection
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Because much of the debate
over cross burning is political rather than judicial, every time a court
is required to determine whether a specific cross burning falls into the
category of intimidation or constitutes political expression, there is a
possibility that protection for political expression will be eroded. The
erosion is much more likely in those instances when the cross burning
is not easily categorized.
One might argue, as Justice Blackmun did in R.A.V., that the
reason for such a shift might have been the temptation to decide the
issue on grounds of “politically correct speech” or “cultural diversity”
338
rather than to adhere to its proper mission, particularly since the
Court was not willing to punish intimidating speech aimed at African
Americans by African Americans, as in Claiborne Hardware.
Regardless of the reason for the shift, its effect, presumably, is
that the Court will now allow proscription of speech that advocates
some possible harm at some possible time in the future. Indeed,
because there need not be an intent to carry out the threat, the rule
does not require an intent to harm—it is sufficient that the speaker
only intends to cause fear. Few cross burnings in the cases adjudicated
by the various state and federal courts, occurred while the burners

336. Id.
337. Id. at 381-82 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
338. 505 U.S. 377, 415-16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
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were present.339 In most cases, indeed, in R.A.V. as well, the burners
placed their crosses, ignited them and then retreated for fear of being
seen. The act of burning a cross in someone’s yard, however, is
apparently sufficiently imbued with a message that it will cause the
inhabitants of the home to become afraid. Under the rule established
in Virginia v. Black, though the method for putting the rule into
operation has yet to be determined, the act may be proscribed and
persons violating cross burning laws may be punished. As previously
indicated, it’s almost as if Justice O’Connor, while striking down
Virginia’s prima facie evidence requirement, is tacitly recognizing that
cross burning is, indeed, a form of intimidation when it is aimed at
specific individuals, regardless of the circumstances.
Virginia v. Black exemplifies the problem. The Court dismissed
the conviction of Barry Black on grounds that the cross burning,
which took place in an open field during a KKK rally, was political
expression. There was testimony at trial by a woman who said she
340
became frightened when she saw the burning cross, however. Does
she not deserve to be protected from that fear?
Similarly, the Court remanded the convictions of Richard Elliott
and Jonathan O’Mara for further action, on grounds that the cross
burning in which they participated was intimidating—they involved
burning a cross in the yard of a neighbor. But could not Elliott and
O’Mara have moved the cross fifty feet or so, outside the boundaries
of the neighbor’s yard, and then argued that they did not intend to
intimidate the neighbor, they merely intended to express their
ideological opposition to integration or to African Americans in
general? Indeed, Justice O’Connor made it clear that, regardless of
the intent of the cross burner, the message of cross burning is always
341
one of hatred. But that’s not enough for the activity to be
proscribed, because sometimes, Justice O’Connor admitted, cross
342
burning constitutes core political speech, and a majority of the
Court agreed that it often is intended to express an ideological
343
message. Only when the activity moves beyond ideology and
339. The exception to this rule occurred when the cross burners took additional
actions designed to heighten the intimidation. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 6 F.3d
918 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994); Washington
v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993).
340. 538 U.S. at 348-49.
341. Id. at 357.
342. Id. at 365.
343. Id. at 357 (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Breyer,
JJ.); id. at 381 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (joined by
Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.).
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becomes intimidating—threatening is no longer the test—may it be
banned.
This is a conundrum with which state and federal courts have
been wrestling since R.A.V. created a similar loophole. States that
have upheld cross-burning statutes have done so on the basis that
cross burnings are threats, which can be proscribed under the First
344
Amendment. In addition, federal courts that have affirmed crossburning convictions have often used the terms “threat” and
345
“intimidation” synonymously or in conjunction with each other.
State courts that have refused to affirm convictions for cross burning,
however, have generally done so because the statutes were contentbased restrictions, and, implicitly, the cross burnings did not rise to
346
the level of threats.
It’s not at all clear whether the ruling in Virginia v. Black would
have changed any of the outcomes of the state or federal cases or
whether it will help lower courts with cross burning cases yet to be
heard. On the one hand, it is relatively simple to establish that cross
burning is only proscribable when it is intimidating. On the other
hand, however, the Court has not established a division that is easily
recognizable. Indeed, cross burning might be the perfect example of
the dilemma the Court recognized 35 years earlier when it established
the intermediate scrutiny test to determine when expressive conduct
347
may be regulated. In United States v. O’Brien, Chief Justice Earl
Warren noted that the court “[C]annot accept the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
348
express ideas.” The government has greater power to regulate
expressive conduct, Chief Justice Warren wrote, “when ‘speech’ and
349
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct.”
Cross burning is the epitome of conduct that combines speech and
344. See, e.g., In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 647-48 (Cal. 1994); State v. T.B.D.,
656 So.2d 497, 480-81 (Fla. 1995);
345. See, e.g., United States v. Haywood, 6 F.3d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 928-29 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821,
825 (8th Cir. 1994).
346. See, e.g., State v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1994).
347. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The test provides that a
government regulation on expressive conduct is constitutional if (1) the regulation is
within the constitutional power of the government, (2) if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
348. Id. at 376.
349. Id.
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nonspeech elements, a point dramatically demonstrated by Justice
350
O’Connor’s majority opinion.

VI. Conclusion
Before 2003, the Supreme Court had established a scheme for
the regulation of threatening and intimidating speech that struck a
reasonable balance between free speech and the expression of true
threats. In Virginia v. Black, however, the Court abandoned that
scheme and replaced it with a significantly more arbitrary approach to
regulating such speech. Under the rules established in the case, a
court must decide when a cross burning is intimidating and when it
constitutes political speech. Even if the cross burning is political,
however, the court must then balance its political speech against a
presumption that the activity is intimidating when it is directed at an
individual or a group. The ruling is a severe limitation of the wellestablished doctrine that a primary purpose of the First Amendment
is the protection of political speech. And it grants to the government
a power the Court has often said the government doesn’t have—the
power to limit expression simply because the government doesn’t like
that expression.
What the Court should have done in the case was to rule that
cross burning is protected political speech, and that prohibitions
against it must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest. Prosecutions for intimidating speech—including cross
burning—remain intact under such a ruling. Indeed, as previously
noted, the federal government has successfully prosecuted cross
burning when such cross burning was clearly designed as
351
intimidation. The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence—from
Schenck through Watts—allows proscriptions on threatening or
intimidating speech without carving out exceptions for specific types
of such speech.
In order to make such a ruling, however, the Court would be
required to repudiate key portions of R.A.V., which it was obviously
unwilling to do. Indeed, Justice O’Connor perpetuated the holding of
352
R.A.V. allowing such carve-outs.
It’s clear that the Court is not finished with its jurisprudence
regarding intimidation in general and cross burning in particular. Just
as the Court first established that obscenity is not protected by the
350. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352-58 (2003).
351. See supra notes 119-48 and accompanying text.
352. 538 U.S. at 361-62.
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First Amendment, then years later established a test to determine
when material is obscene; just as the Court first established that some
expressive conduct is protected and years later determined a test to
determine when that symbolic speech is protected, the Court is
eventually going to have to establish a test to determine when speech
becomes intimidating.
Until that time, unfortunately, the same benediction that Justice
Harry Blackmun pronounced for R.A.V. will apply to Virginia v.
Black: “It will serve as precedent for future cases or it will not. Either
353
result is disheartening.”

353. 505 U.S. 377, 415 (1992)(Blackmun, J., concurring).

